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EVERYTHING YOU EVER
NEEDED TO KNOW ABOUT
LAKES, STREAMS, RIVERS,
RIPARIAN RIGHTS,
ACCRETIONS & AVULSIONS

Robert Honea

EVERYTHING YOU EVER NEEDED TO KNOW
ABOUT LAKES, STREAMS. RIVERS, RIPARIAN RIGHTS,
ACCRETIONS & AVULSIONS
Introduction
"See how this river comes me cranking in, And cuts me from the best of all my
land . . . "

William Shakespeare No. 1 Henry IV, Act 3, Scene 1, Lines 97-98.

“If it’s on the river, it’s all screwed up.”
J. H. Evans, free advice to Bob Honea.
“Honea, that has to be the most boring topic in the history of the Institute.”
One o f my partners, upon receiving the flyer for this Institute.
When I let Chuck Morgan talk me into speaking on this topic, I acquiesced on the
misguided assumption that this subject was a simple one, on which I could prepare a
paper in a brief afternoon, take credit for extra hours for being a speaker, and make it to
the track in plenty of time for the first race. I have since found that the quotes set forth
above accurately summarize this subject. It is indeed mind-numbingly boring, and to
make matters worse arises infrequently.

At the same time, when a riparian rights

problem is encountered, it is invariably a Pandora’s box of problems - those who embark
to resolve such an issue seem to consistently complain of finding themselves up to their
elbows in alligators, when all they really wanted to do was drain the swamp.

It is

certainly the position I have found myself in, both in the course of advising clients and in
the course of preparing this paper.

That having been said, I believe that the problems created by riparian rights law
all have their roots in the fact that this body of law has the practical effect of creating a
moving target. The very boundaries of a person’s land, and the boundaries between
states and counties, can be altered substantially, by circumstances beyond anyone’s
control. Worse yet, there is nothing in the public records which can be relied on to
establish if, when, where, how, and to what extent boundaries may have changed. It is,
instead, an area of the law in which it is truly every man for himself, and often no one
knows who owns what until an appellate court issues a final ruling.
I have attempted in this paper to summarize in as concise a format as possible the
applicable legal principles. Unfortunately, as those of you who have encountered a
riparian rights issue have learned, knowing the applicable rules of law doesn’t solve your
problem, it only tells you what your problem is.
Nevertheless, I hope that the discussion that follows will prove useful.
I.

Historical Background
The roots of modem American law on riparian rights are found in the common

law of England as it existed in the early eighteenth century. English law at that time
divided waters into two categories, navigable and non-navigable. The bed of navigable
waters belonged to the king, while the bed of non-navigable waters belonged to the
owners of the dry land on either side. The reason for the distinction between navigable
and non-navigable waters was the belief that the right and ability to control navigation,
fishing, and other commercial activity was an essential attribute of the king’s sovereignty.
The theory was that the king held such lands (and waters) in trust for all the people, for
the common good.
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The dividing line between navigable and non-navigable waterways under English
common law was the point at which one could no longer observe the effect of tides on the
level of the water. If the ebb and flow of the tide could be confirmed, the water (and the
land under it) belonged to the king; if not, the land and water belonged to the adjoining
landowners. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Ramsey. 53 Ark. 314
(1890).
As to navigable waterways, the boundary line between the king’s land and the
riparian owner was the high water mark. As to non-navigable waterways, the adjoining
owners each took “usque ad medium filum aquae” (literally, “to the middle”). Finally,
English common law recognized the doctrine of accretion, i.e., the premise that as the
action of the wind, waves, and current washed land from one shore and deposited it on
another, the boundary line between the respective owners shifted also, whether the water
be navigable or not. Ramsey, supra; Shively, infra.
When the thirteen original colonies declared their independence from Great
Britain, they claimed title to the beds of all navigable waterways within their borders, on
the ground that they were the sovereign successor to the English crown. See Shively v.
Bowlby. 152 U.S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894). As subsequent states were
admitted to the Union, the “equal footing” doctrine required that such states be admitted
to the Union on the same basis as the original thirteen colonies, to include the right to
sovereign ownership of the beds of all navigable waterways. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan.
3 How. 212, 11 L. Ed. 565 (1845).
As the states acquired title to navigable waterways, most also adopted, by statute
or constitutional provision, the entire body of English common law, en masse, to include
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the previously described rules concerning the definition of navigability, the point at
which boundary lines were to be drawn, and the concept of accretion. See Ark. Code
Ann. § 1-2-119 (Repl. 1996).
This brief history lesson can be distilled to a few general principles that form the
basis of modem American law on riparian rights:

First, the states own the bed of

navigable waters, to the high water mark; second, as to non-navigable waters, the
adjoining (riparian) owners take to the “middle”; third, as the banks of rivers and lakes
shift, so do the boundaries; and, fourth, any controversies concerning riparian rights are
governed by state law. For a good summary of the history of this subject, I refer you to
Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, et al., 482 U.S. 193, 107 S. Ct. 2318, 96 L.
Ed. 2d 162 (1987), and Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel
Company. 429 U.S. 363, 97 S. Ct. 582, 50 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1977).
II.

Navigability

A.

The General Rule
The obvious starting point for any discussion of riparian rights is the question of

whether or not a particular body of water is “navigable.” The early American decisions
followed the English common law, that any water in which the tide ebbed and flowed
was navigable. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). It
soon became apparent, however, that this rule would not work in America. In England,
the commercial usefulness of a body of water was by and large equivalent to whether it
was close enough to the ocean to be affected by tides. In America, there were numerous
rivers and lakes which were clearly commercially useful, but which were far removed
from the effect of the ebb and flow of tides.
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In 1851, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the English definition of
navigability in favor of one more suited to conditions in the United States. The Propeller
Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The general import of the
Genessee Chief case and later decisions was to the effect that waters are navigable in law
when they are navigable in fact, and that rivers are navigable in fact “when they are used
or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.” The Daniel Ball. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). A few years later,
the United States Supreme Court defined navigability in these terms:
“It is not, however, . .
gunning canoe can be
navigable, but, in order
must be generally and
agriculture.”

. every small creek in which a fishing skiff or
made to float at high water which is deemed
to give it the character of a navigable stream, it
commonly useful to some purpose of trade or

The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 442 (1874).
The State of Arkansas has adopted a similar definition of navigability. See, e. g.,
Parker. Commissioner of Revenue v. Moore. 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W. 2d 891 (1953),
where the Arkansas Supreme Court held:
“But our own decisions and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have
given the term [navigability] a practical meaning - a construction in
keeping with realistic concepts of transportation.” (Citations omitted)
Judge William C. Hook of the Eighth Circuit, in dealing with an Arkansas
appeal, said that it was necessary - in order to meet the test of navigability
as understood in American law - that a watercourse should be susceptible
of use for purposes of commerce or possess a capacity for valuable
floatage in the transportation to market of the products of the country
through which it runs. It should, he said, be of practical usefulness to the
public as a highway in its natural state and without the aid of artificial
means. A theoretical or potential navigability, “or one that is temporary,
precarious, and unprofitable, is not sufficient.”
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We agree with Judge Hook’s assertion that “to be navigable a
watercourse must have a useful capacity as a public highway of
transportation.”
Other Arkansas cases utilizing this or an equivalent definition of navigability
include McGahhey v. McCollum, Administrator. 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W. 2d 661 (1944),
and St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314
(1890). For a good summary of the law of navigability in the State of Arkansas prior to
State v. McIlroy, infra, see The Vitality of the Navigability Criterion in the Era of
Environmentalism. 25 Ark. Law Review 250 (1971).
B.

State v. McIlroy
The foregoing definition of navigability was consistently applied in the State of

Arkansas for well over a hundred years, until the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court
in State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 S.W. 2d 659 (1980), a case concerning the
navigability of the Mulberry River. McIlroy arose from a dispute between recreational
users of the Mulberry River, primarily canoers, and the owners of the lands adjoining the
river. Under Arkansas law, if a body of water is non-navigable, the riparian owner not
only owns the bed of the stream, but has the right to exclude others from using the water
overlying his land. Medlock v. Galbreath. 208 Ark. 681, 187 S.W. 2d 545 (1945). The
owners of lands adjoining the Mulberry, relying on this principle, initiated litigation
seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the recreational use of the Mulberry. The State of
Arkansas intervened, claiming that the Mulberry was navigable and that the bed of the
stream therefore belonged to the State, for the use and benefit of the public.
In a lengthy opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged the historical
definition of navigability set forth above, and went so far as to state that “therefore, a
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river is legally navigable, if actually navigable and actually navigable if commercially
valuable.”

Id. at 235.

After recognizing that this was the proper definition of

navigability, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court went on to hold that the Mulberry
River was in fact navigable, notwithstanding the fact that the proof, by any reasonable
reading, only established recreational uses. The decision drew a vigorous and lengthy
dissent. One point made by the dissent, and completely ignored by the majority, was the
fact that the McIlroy decision worked a substantial change in vested property rights.
Applying the McIlroy definition of navigability, any stream that could float a canoe, even
part of the year, would arguably be navigable, thus vesting title to the minerals
underlying the bed of the stream in the State of Arkansas.
The mischief caused by the McIlroy decision as it relates to title to the oil, gas,
and minerals underlying the Mulberry River was quickly resolved by statute. In 1981,
the Arkansas legislature quitclaimed the bed of the Mulberry River to the adjacent
riparian owners, reserving an easement for the use of the public in the water itself. Ark.
Code Ann. § 22-5-406. The statute includes a procedure by which affected riparian
owners can obtain a quitclaim deed from the Arkansas Land Commissioner.
Interestingly, the statutory quitclaim conveyed all of the Mulberry River, even though the
lower stretches of it were probably properly characterized as navigable by the old
definition. Indeed, I am curious as to whether there are producing units which include
the lower part of the Mulberry River, on which royalties are being paid to the State of
Arkansas even though the State no longer owns such lands.
There have been no decisions since McIlroy in which any effort was made to
apply the “new” definition of navigability to other streams or waterways. My prediction
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is that if and when this issue should arise again, the McIlroy decision will be discredited,
and the Arkansas Supreme Court will instead adopt a “public easement” theory which
allows a ruling in favor of the recreational users, but leaves title, and specifically title to
oil, gas, and minerals, as it was. In any event, if the Arkansas Supreme Court followed
McIlroy literally, I would guess that the Arkansas legislature would in turn follow its
precedent of quitclaiming the oil, gas, and minerals to the adjoining landowners, just as it
did in the case of the Mulberry River. Nevertheless, McIlroy is the latest pronouncement
of the Arkansas Supreme Court on the definition of navigability, and on its face it says
that if you can float a canoe on a body of water, even part of the year, it is navigable and
the State owns it.
C.

The Position of the Corps of Engineers and the Land Commissioner
If you call the Arkansas Land Commissioner’s office and ask the Land

Commissioner to tell you what lands the State of Arkansas claims are navigable, you will
be told that the Land Commissioner believes that anything the Corps of Engineers
considers navigable is owned by the State of Arkansas. I am attaching as Exhibit A to
this paper a copy of the printout listing the streams located in the Little Rock District of
the Corps of Engineers which are considered navigable by the Corps. I suggest that you
will find it interesting reading. For example, the White River is considered navigable all
the way to the Highway 45 bridge in Goshen, Arkansas. For those of you unfamiliar with
the State of Arkansas, Goshen is located a few miles east of Fayetteville, in the northwest
comer of the State, upstream of Beaver Lake. Believe it or not, those of you who have
enjoyed trout fishing on the White River have actually been floating on a navigable
waterway, at least according to the Corps of Engineers.
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My guess is that there are quite a few producing units which include lands listed
on Exhibit A, and which have not been leased from the State of Arkansas, on the
assumption that the body of water was not navigable and that the adjoining landowners
therefore held title. In fact, I know of at least one instance in which this exact situation
recently occurred - a third party purchased a lease from the State of Arkansas for lands in
a producing unit, and the third party then notified the operator that it intended to fully
participate the interest. I do not know whether this dispute has been resolved, and if so,
what the outcome was.
D.

Can “Navigability” End, And If So, What Happens?
The Arkansas Supreme Court has very clearly held that “once navigable, always

navigable” is not the rule in the State of Arkansas. Parker. Commissioner of Revenue v.
Moore, supra. The Arkansas Supreme Court has further held that “once the navigability
of a stream ceases, the rights of the riparian owner attach.” Gill v. Porter. 248 Ark. 140,
450 S.W. 2d 306 (1970). “. . . [T]he State’s title rests on navigability and . . . once the
navigability of a stream ceases, the rights of the riparian owner attach . . ..” Gill v.
Porter. 248 Ark. 142, 450 S.W. 2d 306 (1970). See also Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas.
252 Ark. 958, 482 S.W. 2d 598 (1972), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
and adopted the following opinion of the chancellor:
“At the moment of, or upon the closing of the old river channel and the
opening of the new cut-off, the old river channel ceased to be navigable,
as was intended; and thus the State lost its claim or title thereto; and title
to the old river bed vested in the then riparian owners.”
This rule applies whether the cause of the cessation of navigability is natural or manmade. Porter, supra; United States v. Keenan. 753 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1985).
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There is also a statute in Arkansas which codifies this rule, at least as to dry lands
above the ordinary high water mark. It reads, in pertinent part:
(a) “The title to all lands which have formed or may form in the beds of
non-navigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether or
not still navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above the ordinary
high water mark, shall vest in the riparian owners to the lands and shall be
assessed and taxed as other lands.”
(b) “The lands referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include
those lands which have emerged or which may emerge by accretion,
reliction, evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds of lakes or
from former navigable streams, whether by natural or artificial causes, or
whether or not the lakes were originally formed from the channel or
course of navigable or nonnavigable streams.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996). (There is also a companion statute which sets
forth a procedure for obtaining a deed from the State of Arkansas for such lands, Ark.
Code Ann. § 22-5-405 (Repl. 1996)).
It would seem from the foregoing that this issue is relatively straightforward. If
the body of water is no longer navigable, the State’s title ends, and ownership vests
immediately, at the moment navigability ceases, in the riparian landowners.
If you make the mistake of asking the Land Commissioner to state Arkansas’
position on this topic, however, you don’t necessarily get a straight answer.

I am

attaching as Exhibit B to this paper a letter from the Land Commissioner, attaching an
opinion letter from the Attorney General’s office. The Land Commissioner’s position
statement and the AG’s opinion concern a bend in the river that was cut off when the
Corps of Engineers dredged a new channel.

The work performed by the Corps of

Engineers would appear to have very clearly terminated the navigability of this body of
water - at either end, the Corps of Engineers constructed dikes and revetments, of such a
size and shape that the old river channel was entirely cut off from the new river channel
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by dry land. It would seem logical to conclude that navigability ended when the dikes
and revetments were constructed, landlocking the old river channel. Not so. According
to the attached AG’s opinion letter and the Land Commissioner’s position statement, as
long as there is still standing water, the State claims title, unless and until the final
decision of a court of competent jurisdiction concludes that navigability has ceased.
E.

Artificially Created Navigable Waters
By statute, Arkansas has disclaimed any interest in mineral rights underlying

navigable waters which have been artificially created. Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-815 (Repl.
1996). This statute includes a procedure whereby the owner of such lands can obtain a
deed from the State of Arkansas.
F.

Conclusion
I told you in the first part of this paper that the State owns the bed of navigable

waters, and that the riparian owners hold title to the bed of non-navigable waters. I have
now given you the historical definition of navigability, as it exists in Arkansas today, a
statement of what the Corps of Engineers considers navigable, and a statement of the
position of the Land Commissioner of the State of Arkansas as to what it is, exactly, the
State claims title to. I challenge you to sort through all of this and come up with a clearcut criteria for determining where navigability starts and stops. For my part, I again
quote J. H. Evans: “If it’s on the river, it’s all screwed up.”
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IV.

Accretion and Avulsion

A.

Definitions and Distinctions
The concepts of accretion and avulsion are easily stated, but difficult of

application. The Arkansas Supreme Court defined accretion in the early case of St.
Louis. Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314 (1890) in
these terms:
“Accretion is the increase of real estate, by the addition of portions of soil
by gradual deposition, through the operation of natural causes, to that
already in the possession of the owner.” Id. at 323.
Six years later, in the case of Wallace v. Driver. 61 Ark. 429 (1896), the Arkansas
Supreme Court elaborated on the definition of accretion, describing it in these terms:
“In order to constitute an accretion, it is not necessary that the formation
be indiscernible by comparison at two distinct points of time. It is true
that it is an addition to riparian land, “gradually and imperceptibly made
by the water to which the land is contiguous;” but the true test “as to what
is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is that, though the
witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they
could not perceive it while the process was going on..””
In both Ramsey and Wallace, the Court recognized that where the water’s edge
has shifted by the process of accretion, the boundary lines have shifted with the water.
“Hence, land formed by alluvion, or the gradual and imperceptible
accretion from the water, and land gained by reliction, or the gradual and
imperceptible recession of the water, belong to the owner of the
contiguous land to which the addition is made.” Wallace, supra, at 431.
The concept and definition of accretion, and the effect of accretion on boundary
lines, is to be distinguished from avulsion.

In a broad sense, avulsion is the exact

opposite of accretion. Stated differently, where the change in the location of a body of
water is sudden and perceptible, the change is described as an avulsion, rather than an
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accretion.

Also, and again in contradistinction to the rules that apply to accretion,

boundary lines do not change with a shift in the location of the body of water resulting
from an avulsion. Instead, they remain and become fixed at their former location.
“The reverse of what has been said of accretions and erosions is true of
avulsions. Where a stream which forms a boundary line of lands from any
cause suddenly abandons its old, and seeks a new, bed, or suddenly and
perceptibly washes away its banks, such change of channel or banks (if its
limits can be determined) works no change of boundary. The owner still
holds his title to the submerged land.” Wallace, supra, at 436.
In a case involving a dispute between Arkansas and Tennessee over the boundary
line between the states, Arkansas v. Tennessee. 246 U.S. 158, 38 S. Ct. 301, 62 L. Ed.
638 (1918), the United States Supreme Court described the two concepts, and the effect
of the distinction between them, in the following terms:
“When the bed and channel are changed by the natural and gradual
processes known as erosion and accretion, the boundary follows the
varying course of the stream; while if the stream from any cause, natural
or artificial, suddenly leaves its old bed and forms a new one, by the
process known as an avulsion, the resulting change of channel works no
change of boundary, which remains in the middle of the old channel,
although no water may be flowing in it, and irrespective of subsequent
changes in the new channel.”
Other Arkansas cases discussing accretion and avulsion include Home v. Howe
Lumber Company. 209 Ark. 202, 190 S.W. 2d 7 (1947), Crow v. Johnston. 209 Ark.
1053, 194 S.W. 2d 193 (1946), and Yutterman v. Grier. 112 Ark. 366, 166 S.W. 749
(1914).

For a good summary of the Arkansas cases on accretion and avulsion prior to

1951, see Real Property - Riparian Rights - Accretion. Reliction, and Avulsion. 6 Ark.
Law Rev. 68 (1951). One footnote is appropriate here - although it seems obvious, it
bears emphasis that the rules of accretion and avulsion apply equally to navigable and
non-navigable waters.
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From the foregoing discussion, two conclusions can be drawn.

First, if the

location of a body of water has changed, it has been due to either accretion or avulsion.
There is no gray area in between; the movement was due to one or the other. Second, if
the movement of the body of water was due to accretion, the boundaries of the adjoining
landowners shifted with it, but if the movement was due to avulsion, the boundary lines
not only stayed where they were, they became fixed and permanent.
Having set forth the general rules, I am afraid I can provide you with little
guidance as to how these rules should be applied in the real world. For example, if there
has ever been any movement of a body of water due to an avulsion, the boundary lines
between the riparian owners became fixed, never to change again regardless of any
subsequent accretion, erosion, or avulsion. Needless to say, if one were inclined to argue
the point, it would seem easy to find evidence somewhere, at some point in time, that the
body of water in question was at a location you wanted it to be, then put together some
kind of proof that its subsequent movement was due to an avulsion. A good example is
McGee v. Matthews, 241 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. Ark. 1965), in which the party claiming an
avulsion presented expert testimony that the type and age of trees on the land in question
proved that the river’s movement was due to an avulsion, and not an accretion. Another
example is Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289, 94 S. Ct. 1046 (1973), in which the
party claiming an avulsion had a geologist take soil borings, then testify that the soil
layers were inconsistent with the concept of accretion.
There are numerous other Arkansas cases in which the distinction between
accretion and avulsion has been litigated. For my part, the only common thread I can see
in the cases is that the party who has the burden of proof seems to lose the vast majority
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of the cases. There is a stated presumption in favor of accretions. Pannell v. Earls, 252
Ark. 385, S.W. 2d 440 (1972). Nevertheless, I cannot distill from the cases any one fact
or set of facts which appears to be dispositive of whether the movement was accretion or
avulsion. Again, this is an area of the law in which each case turns on its facts, and no
one can know for sure what the final resolution will be until the appellate court issues its
mandate.
B.

Acts of Man - Accretion or Avulsion?
In cases where the change in the location of a body of water is due to the acts of

man, and specifically the acts of the Corps of Engineers, every Arkansas decision I have
read holds that such changes are due to an avulsion, and not an accretion. See, e.g.,
Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas Company, supra. Indeed, I could find no Arkansas case
in which the argument was even raised that changes due to the acts of man constitute an
accretion, rather than an avulsion. I must also point out, however, that the United States
Supreme Court has reached the opposite result, at least where the acts of man do not
change the location of the channel, but only narrow it. In Bonelli Cattle Company v.
Arizona. 414 U.S. 313, 94 S. Ct. 517 (1973), the actions of the Corps of Engineers in
channeling the Colorado River had the effect of narrowing its bed, thereby creating dry
land. The location of the channel itself, however, was not changed. The Supreme Court
held that the newly formed dry land was an accretion rather than an avulsion.
The conclusion I draw from Bonelli is that if the acts of man do not change the
location of the channel, but rather only confine and restrict it to a narrower area, there is
at least an argument to be made that any resulting dry land is due to an accretion, rather
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than an avulsion. This precise argument has never been addressed under Arkansas law,
and it therefore remains an open question in this state.

C.

The “Accretion Exception” Rule
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, other courts

have recognized the “accretion exception” rule. The typical fact pattern in which this
exception arises is a situation where a river has looped back on itself, creating a peninsula
with only a narrow strip of land at the base of the peninsula dividing the flow of the river.
When the river gradually and slowly cuts a new channel across the narrow neck of land,
ultimately creating a new channel and leaving an ox-bow, some courts have concluded
that the rules of avulsion should apply, notwithstanding the fact that the change in the
location of the channel was due to the gradual and imperceptible process of accretion and
erosion.

The United States Supreme Court, in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v.

Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363, 97 S. Ct. 582 (1977), stated the rule in these
terms:
“[The accretion rule] is applicable to and governs cases where the
boundary line, the thread of the stream, by the slow and gradual processes
of erosion and accretion creeps across the intervening space between its
old and its new location. To this rule, however, there is a well-established
and rational exception. It is that, where a river changes its main channel,
not by excavating, passing over, and then filling the intervening place
between its old and its new main channel, but by flowing around this
intervening land, which never becomes in the meantime its main channel,
and the change from the old to the new main channel is wrought during
many years by the gradual or occasional increase from year to year of the
proportion of the waters of the river passing over the course which
eventually becomes the new main channel, and the decrease from year to
year of the proportion of its waters passing through the old main channel
until the greater part of its waters flow through the new main channel, the
boundary line between the estates remains in the old channel subject to
such changes in that channel as are wrought by erosion or accretion while
the water in it remains a running stream.” Id at 368, 585.
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As I have already indicated, this precise issue has never been directly considered

or addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. There is a federal district court case
applying Arkansas law, however, in which this exact fact pattern was presented. The
court there never discussed the “accretion exception” rule, but instead addressed the
issues as a straightforward accretion vs. avulsion case. The court there ruled that the
creation of the cutoff was the result of accretion, thus vesting title to the ox-bow lake and
the cut-off peninsula in the riparian owner on the opposite bank. McGee v. Matthews,
supra. Similarly, in a case involving an island on a non-navigable waterway, the same
result was reached on a standard accretion/evulsion analysis. Goforth v. Wilson, 208
Ark. 33, 184 S.W. 2d 665 (1967). Again, this “exception” was not argued or mentioned.
I do not understand why this argument has never been presented to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, as it seems a logical one. In any event, if you encounter this fact pattern,
you should be aware of this exception.
D.

Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996)
In 1945, the Arkansas legislature passed Act No. 203. The legislation was very

clearly intended to provide riparian landowners with a means of acquiring a deed from
the State of Arkansas for lands which had formed in the beds of formerly navigable lakes
and streams. The way the statute is phrased, however, I believe it could be construed as
adopting the “accretion exception” rule. In any event, because the statute provides a
means for obtaining a deed from the State of Arkansas, it is a statute that merits particular
consideration. The statute reads as follows:
“(a) The title to all lands which have formed or may form in the beds of
non-navigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether or
not still navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above the ordinary
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high water mark, shall vest in the riparian owners to the lands and shall be
assessed and taxed as other lands.
(b) The lands referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include
those lands which have emerged or which may emerge by accretion,
reliction, evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds of lakes or
from former navigable streams, whether by natural or artificial causes, or
whether or not the lakes were originally formed from the channel or
course of navigable or non-navigable streams.” Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5404 (Repl. 1996).”
This legislation was originally adopted in 1945. In 1953, the language of this
statute was amended. The preamble to the 1953 Act read:
“Whereas, many cutoffs have been made in the Mississippi River, and
other rivers in the State of Arkansas, both naturally and artificially for the
purpose of controlling the current of the river and the bank stabilization,
and many old former river beds have remained as the result of such cutoffs
and have gradually built up and reached the high water mark as defined by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas,. . . , and permanent timber vegetation has
grown on all or parts of said old abandoned river beds; and,
Whereas, it is intended hereby to clarify the intent of [Ark. Code Ann. §
22-5-404], and to eliminate any questions as to the intent thereof;. . . . ”
The 1953 amendments resulted in the statute in its present form.
As originally enacted, the statute included a procedure whereby the riparian
owner could obtain a deed from the State of Arkansas for such lands:
“The Commissioner of State Lands is hereby empowered and authorized
to execute deeds to such lands to riparian owners upon application and the
filing of proof of record ownership of adjacent lands and proof of proper
survey of said lands, conveying all the right, title, and interest of the State
of Arkansas to such lands as have emerged or may hereafter emerge to the
mean high water mark of any such stream or lake.”
The latter section is now codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-405 (Repl. 1996).
When the Arkansas Code of 1989 was adopted, the reference to “such lands” was
changed to “lands described in § 22-5-404.”
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Surprisingly, there are few cases in which this statute is interpreted or applied. In
those cases, however, there is no suggestion that the statute modifies the case law
definitions of, and distinctions between, accretion and avulsion.

See, e.g., Porter v.

Arkansas Western Gas Company, 252 Ark. 958, 482 S.W. 2d 598 (1972). Indeed, the
cases appear to accept the statute as having been enacted for the sole purpose of
providing a means for riparian landowners to obtain record title from the State of
Arkansas to lands that have been formed by accretion in the beds of formerly navigable
waterways.
Having said that, I would also suggest to you that this statute could be read as a
legislative adoption of the “accretion exception” rule described in subparagraph (C)
above. Indeed, particularly in view of the preamble to the 1953 amendments, I don’t see
how you could read the statute any other way.
Other than to the extent the statute may constitute a legislative adoption of the
“accretion exception” rule, it appears to me to be consistent with the common law
definitions of, and distinctions between, accretion and avulsion, and the cases are
consistent with this reading. In any event, those of you who encounter riparian rights
issues need to be aware that this statute exists, as it provides a means of obtaining a deed
from the State of Arkansas for accretions to riparian lands adjoining formerly navigable
waterways.
E.

Apportionment of Alluvion
Assuming land has formed by accretion, the next question which is encountered is

the problem of dividing the alluvion among the riparian owners. In Malone v. Mobbs,
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102 Ark. 542 (1912), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the following rule for
dividing alluvion:
“This rule is laid down for the division of alluvion between the contiguous
riparian proprietors - First: To measure the whole extent of the ancient
bank or line of the river, and compute how many rods, yards or feet each
riparian proprietor owned on the riverline; Second: Supposing the former
line for instance to amount to 200 rods, to divide the newly formed bank
or river line into 200 equal parts, and appropriate to each proprietor as
many portions of this new river line, as he owned rods on the old; then, to
complete the division, lines are drawn from the points at which the
proprietors respectively bounded on the old to the points thus determined
as the points of division of the newly formed shore.”
The Court went on to note that there may be peculiar circumstances in which use
of this rule would be inequitable, and that in appropriate circumstances the application of
this rule might be appropriately modified by a court of equity. Nevertheless, this remains
the general rule in Arkansas. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Horan. 193 Ark. 85 (1936).
V.

Boundary Lines

A.

Navigable Waters - Ordinary High Water Mark
As I mentioned in the historical background at the beginning of this paper, for

navigable waters the English common law fixed the boundary between the king’s
ownership of navigable waterways and riparian owners at the high water mark, i.e., high
tide. Arkansas has adopted this rule by fixing the line at the ordinary high water mark.
St. Louis. Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Ramsey. 53 Ark. 314 (1890).
In that case, in discussing where the ordinary high water mark was to be located, the
Court stated that “what the river does not occupy long enough to rest from vegetation, so
far as to destroy its value for agriculture, is not river bed.” The Court also said that “the
banks of a river are those elevations of land which confine the waters when they rise out
of the bed; and the bed is that soil so usually covered by water as to be distinguishable
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from the bank by the character of the soil, or vegetation, or both, produced by the
common presence and action of flowing water.” A later case held that the line is to be
found by “ascertaining where the presence and action of water are so usual and longcontinued in ordinary years as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from
that of the banks in respect to vegetation and the nature of the soil.” State ex rel.
Thompson v. Parker. 132 Ark. 316 (1917). This definition has remained unchanged to
the present.
In passing, I note that since the states own to the high water mark, they can adopt
their own rules as to where the line is to be drawn. For example, Tennessee fixes the
boundary at the ordinary low water mark. Arkansas v. Tennessee. 246 U.S. 158, 38 S.
Ct. 301 (1917).
B.

States and Counties, and the Rule of the Thalweg
Where a river forms the boundary line between two states or two counties, the

states or counties are, in effect, riparian owners on opposite banks. If you ask people for
their knee-jerk reaction to the question of where the boundary should be between the two,
the vast majority are of the opinion that the boundary line is the exact middle of the river,
equidistant between the two banks. This is absolutely wrong.
In the case of Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 62 L. Ed. 638, 38 S. Ct. 301
(1917), the United States Arkansas Supreme Court fixed the boundary line between the
States of Arkansas and Tennessee.

The Court began by summarizing European law

concerning waters that formed the boundary between two sovereign nations.

Under

European law, the boundary line was fixed at the middle of the navigable channel, or
thalweg (literally, the “valley way”). If you stop to think about it, the rule makes sense.
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The navigable channel moves back and forth, sometimes adjacent to one bank, sometimes
adjacent to the other. If the boundary line were the exact middle, neither nation could
make use of the navigation channel, without trespassing upon the other’s lands. Putting
the boundary in the exact middle of the deepest part of the channel gave each nation an
equal right to use the waterway. The United States Supreme Court found the reasoning
sound, and therefore adopted the rule of the thalweg as the principle to be utilized in
fixing the boundary between the States of Arkansas and Tennessee. This same rule was
later applied to a dispute between Arkansas and Mississippi, Arkansas v. Mississippi. 250
U.S. 39, 63 L. Ed. 832, 39 S. Ct. 422 (1919).
Arkansas has adopted this same rule for fixing the location of the boundary line
between counties. See Gill v. Porter, 248 Ark. 140, 450 S.W.2d 306 (1970); McGee v.
Matthews. 241 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
The general rules of accretion and avulsion also apply to the boundary lines
between states and counties. Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra; Arkansas v. Mississippi.
supra; DeLoney v. State. 88 Ark. 311, 115 S.W. 138 (1908); Adkisson v. Starr. 222 Ark.
331, 260 S.W.2d 956 (1953); Gill v. Porter, supra.
One caveat is in order.

When determining the boundary between states and

counties, it is important to examine the treaty, statute, or constitutional provision which
creates the state or county. If the enabling legislation clearly provides, the boundary can
be fixed at one bank or the other, rather than the thalweg. For example, the boundary
between Arkansas and Texas is the south bank of the Red River, not the thalweg. See.
DeLoney v. State, supra. Similarly, in Gill v. Hedgecock, 207 Ark. 1079, 184 S.W.2d
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262 (1944), the Arkansas Supreme Court noted in dicta that the statute creating Little
River County fixed the northern boundary line at the north bank of the Little River.
C.

Non-Navigable Waters
The cases I have read discussing 18th century English law uniformly speak in

terms of the “middle” or “center” when discussing the location of the boundary between
riparian owners on non-navigable waters. The early Arkansas cases are a mix of this
definition and something that sounds like the rule of the thalweg. Compare Kilgo v.
Cook, 174 Ark. 432 (1927) (“the middle or thread of the stream”) with McGahhey v.
McCollum. Administrator. 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W.2d 661 (1944) (“the riparian owner
upon a non-navigable stream takes to the center of it.”). The more recent cases, however,
very clearly hold that the rule of the thalweg applies to non-navigable waterways also.
See, e.g., Gill v. Porter. 248 Ark. 140,450 S.W.2d 306 (1970).
D.

“Fencing” Water
As odd as it sounds, Arkansas law allows riparian owners on non-navigable

waterways to “fence” their water. In Medlock v. Galbreath. 208 Ark. 681, 187 S.W.2d
545 (1945), a riparian landowner sought an injunction, excluding commercial fishermen
from floating their boats over his land. The Court there held that while the land itself
belonged to the riparian owner, the fish (and presumably the water) did not. The Court
therefore allowed the fishermen to continue using the waters for their commercial fishing
operation. The Court expressly noted, however, that the landowner had made no effort to
enclose his lands with any kind of floating boom or fence. In this regard, the Arkansas
court cited with approval a Pennsylvania decision in which the Pennsylvania court held,
clearly and in so many words, that a riparian owner can in fact enclose the waters over his
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land, and upon doing so, the courts will uphold his right to exclude the public from the
waters overlying his land.
This is still good law in Arkansas. In this regard, I refer you back to the case of
State v. McIlroy, supra, discussed in the section of this paper dealing with navigability.
If Medlock v. Galbreath were not the law of Arkansas, the McIlroy decision would have
been unnecessary.

Indeed, in McIlroy the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the

chancellor in the trial below had held that the riparian property owners had “the
incidental right to prevent the public from using the stream.” Id. at 229. The Arkansas
Supreme Court did not quarrel with this conclusion of the chancellor, but rather accepted
it at face value and went on to reverse his decision by finding the river navigable, rather
than by modifying the rule of law announced in Medlock v. Galbreath, supra.
VI.

Emerging Lands

A.

The General Rule
In its strictest sense, the phrase “emerging lands” refers to a situation where the

land of a riparian owner has been completely submerged by the gradual movement of a
river in one direction, then re-emerges when the river moves back in the opposite
direction. This exact fact pattern was confronted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Younts v. Crockett. 238 Ark. 971, 385 S.W.2d 928 (1965). In that case, Crockett owned
land platted as Lot 1, and Younts owned land platted as Lot 5. Lot 1 was a narrow strip
of land bordered on one side by the Arkansas River and on the other by Lot 5. The
Younts contended that the Arkansas River had gradually shifted until it completely
submerged all of Lot 1, and that the river thereafter gradually shifted back in the other
direction until it had returned to its former boundary. The Younts claimed these newly
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formed lands as accretions to Lot 5. The Crocketts, on the other hand, claimed that Lot 1
had never been completely submerged, and that the newly formed lands were therefore
accretions to Lot 1.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held in favor of the Crocketts, primarily on the
ground that the Younts, as plaintiffs, had the burden of proof, and they had not proven
that the river had shifted to the point that Lot 1 had been wholly engulfed by the bed of
the river. In reaching this decision, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court announced
very clearly that if it could be shown that the river had shifted to the point that Lot 1 was
completely submerged, it would cease to exist, and if accretions formed thereafter, they
would be accretions to Lot 5, and would not belong to the former owners of Lot 1.
“If the gradual westward movement of the river’s channel finally
submerged Lot 1, so that it was wholly engulfed by the shifting bed of the
river, Lot 1 went out of existence. In that event the tract now in dispute
would have re-emerged as an accretion to Lot 5. (Citation omitted). On
the other hand, if the western boundary of Lot 1 was submerged only by
temporary overflows that did not last long enough to establish a new high
water mark as that term is defined in our cases, Lot 1 was not destroyed.
(Citation omitted).
Other states would reach a contrary result on these facts. See, e.g., Choctaw and
Chickasaw Nations v. Tibbetts. 430 F. Supp. 714 (E. D. Okla. 1976) (applying Oklahoma
law); Bonelli Cattle Company v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 94 S. Ct. 517 (1973) (applying
federal law). This is still good law in Arkansas, however.
It is also worth mentioning A.C.A. of 22-5-403 (Repl. 1996) again. I read the
statue as being consistent with the decision in Younts, although no case has ever
discussed this point.
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B.

Islands
A completely different set of rules applies where the “emerging lands” are in the

form of an island. Arkansas has adopted two statutes concerning islands that form in
navigable waterways. The earlier statute provides that where islands form in navigable
waterways within the boundaries of a former owner, such islands belong to the former
owner.
“All land which has formed or may form in the navigable waters of this
state, and within the original boundaries of a former owner of land upon
such waters, shall belong to and the title thereto shall vest in the former
owner, his heirs or assigns, or in whoever may have lawfully succeeded to
the right of the former owner therein.” Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-403 (Repl.
1996).
This statute does not apply to accretions to the mainland, but rather concerns only
islands. Gray v. Malone. 142 Ark. 609, 219 S.W. 742 (1920). Also, this statute is limited
to that portion of an island that forms within the boundaries of a former owner. If the
island extends by accretion outside the former boundaries, the usual rules of accretion do
not apply; ownership stops at the former boundary. Mills v. Protho, et al., 143 Ark. 117,
219 S.W. 1017 (1920). Presumably, if the island initially formed outside the boundaries
of the former owner, but extended by accretion across the former boundary, the former
owner would own the accretions to the island which formed within his original
boundaries.
The second statute is Ark. Code Ann. § 22-6-202(A) (Repl. 1996). That statute
provides:
“All islands formed or which may form in the navigable waters of this
State are declared to be the property of the State . . . . ”
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One would think, upon reading this statute and § 22-5-403, that the two statutes
are mutually exclusive. The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, has held that they are
not. Ward v. Harwood. 239 Ark. 69, 387 S.W. 2d 318 (1965). In that case, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that § 22-6-202 applies only to islands that form in navigable
waterways, outside the boundaries of a former owner.
In regard to islands forming in non-navigable waterways, the only question is
determining the location of the thalweg. See, e.g., Goforth v. Wilson. 208 Ark. 33, 184
S.W.2d 814 (1945), in which the litigation concerned ownership of an island. The proof
established that historically the main channel of the river had been on the south side of
the island, while there had been only a slough on the north side of the island, completely
submerged only during times of high water. By the time of trial, however, the proof
established that the main channel of the river had shifted to the north side of the island,
such that only a slough was left on the south side, again fully submerged only in times of
high water. After accepting that the movement was due to accretion, the court there held
that ownership of the island was determined by ascertaining which side of the main
channel the river was located on.
In the situation where accretions to an island and the mainland grow until they
join, the owners of the island and the owners of the mainland take to the point where they
join. Cummings v. Boyles. 242 Ark. 38, 411 S.W.2d 665 (1967). Also, I again refer you
to Ark. Code Ann. § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996). The statute may have some relevance to
islands, depending on the specific facts.
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VII.

What Happens to Severed Minerals?
There are no Arkansas cases which address the question of what happens to

severed minerals, when surface boundaries move due to accretion. Oklahoma, Montana,
and Texas, however, have each held that severed minerals move with the surface estate.
Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Company, 614 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1980); Jackson v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 205 Mont. 200, 667 P.2d 406 (1983); Ely v. Brilev. 959 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.
1998).

The result in these cases has been criticized in two Law Review articles,

Murphree, “Oil and Gas: The Inapplicability o f Accretion to Severed Mineral Estate, ”
34 Okla. L. Rev. 826 (1981), and Kimball, Accretion and Severed Mineral Estates, 53
Univ. of Chic. L. Rev. 232 (1986
VIII. Miscellaneous Issues
A.

Conveyances by the United States Prior to Statehood
In Section I of this paper, I noted that the original thirteen colonies acquired title

to navigable waterways upon declaring their independence from Great Britain, as the
sovereign successors to the English crown. When subsequent states were admitted, they
acquired the same rights to navigable waterways, under the “equal footing” doctrine. At
the same time, however, most subsequently admitted states, to include Arkansas,
acquired their title from the United States of America. The question therefore arises:
Was it possible for the United States to convey the title of navigable waterways to third
parties, prior to statehood?

The answer to this question is yes, although the

circumstances in which this arises are very limited.
In the case of Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma. 397 U.S. 619, 90A S. Ct. 1328
(1970), the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Cherokee Nations asserted title to the bed of the
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Arkansas River from the head of navigation at the confluence of the Grand and Arkansas
Rivers in northeast Oklahoma downstream to the Arkansas border. The case includes a
fascinating discussion of the history of riparian rights and Indian law, particularly the
various treaties between the United States and the five civilized tribes. In the end, the
United States Supreme Court concluded that by virtue of various treaties, principally the
Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the United States had effectively conveyed fee title to a
navigable waterway (the Arkansas River) to the Indian Nations. Thus, when Oklahoma
was later admitted as a state, it did not acquire title to the bed of the navigable portion of
the Arkansas River.
Since the Choctaw decision, there have been no other cases decided in which the
Supreme Court has held that the United States did in fact convey fee title to navigable
waterways to a third party prior to statehood. Indeed, in Utah Division of State Lands v.
The United States, 482 U.S. 191, 96 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 2318 (1987), the Supreme
Court noted that the Choctaw decision was the sole case in which this result was reached.
Nevertheless, the decision does establish that it is at least possible that the United States
conveyed the title to the bed of a navigable waterway to a third party, prior to statehood,
and that the state therefore does not own it. I do not know of any instance in which this
occurred in Arkansas, but if by chance you encounter a Patent from the United States
which purports to convey the bed of a navigable waterway to an individual, prior to
statehood, you should at least recognize that the individual may have a valid claim to the
bed of the waterway.
One interesting footnote to the Choctaw case is the position the Indian Nations are
presently taking. As I understand it, the Indian Nations are now contending that they
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own the bed of the river, not only where it is presently located, but anywhere it has ever
been located at any time in the past, to include property that has been dry land for many
years.

I anticipate it will be interesting to watch the development of these claims,

particularly in light of the fact that the Indian Nations cannot be made a party to litigation
without their consent.
B.

State Law Does Not Always Govern
One practical effect of the acquisition of title to navigable waterways upon

statehood is that state law governs all disputes and controversies over ownership of
navigable waterways. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra. Where the riparian owner is
the United States of America, however, this general rule does not apply.
In California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 73
L. Ed. 2d 1, 103 S. Ct. 14 (1982), the United States owned a Coast Guard station on
riparian lands bordering navigable waterways, the bed of which was owned by the State
of California.

The federal government built dikes and revetments for navigation

purposes, which had the practical effect of causing accretions to the Coast Guard station
land. California law would have held that the lands belonged to the State of California,
as the accretions were the result of artificial rather than natural causes. The United States
Supreme Court, however, held that federal law governed in this particular circumstance,
and that under federal law, the accretions belonged to the riparian landowner, the United
States.
The point to be made here is that if you encounter a situation in which the United
States is the riparian landowner, you should be conscious of the fact that you may be
playing by a different set of rules.

30

C.

Payment of Taxes and Adverse Possession
The payment of taxes on riparian lands amounts to payment of taxes on accretions

to such land. River Land Company v. McAlexander, 10 Ark. App. 123, 661 S.W.2d 451
(1983).

At the same time, however, Arkansas would apparently hold that adverse

possession of riparian lands does not necessarily include accretions to that land. See,e.g.,
Sherman v. Chicago Mill and Lumber Company. 233 Ark. 277, 344 S.W.2d 345 (1961),
in which the court held that Sherman had established title to an island by adverse
possession, and River Land Company v. McAlexander, supra, in which the court held
that the decision in Sherman only vested title in the adverse possessor to the bank, and
that the adverse possessor was therefore not a riparian owner entitled to accretions. This
doesn’t seem to make any sense, but that is the holding of the cases.
Although it sounds odd, by building a dam and permanently flooding private
property, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the state can adversely possess
private land. State ex rel. Thompson v. Parker. 132 Ark. 316(1917). I can’t imagine this
result would ever be reached today, particularly in light of the due process clause and
Ark. Code Ann. Sec 22-5-404. Nevertheless, in 1917, the Arkansas Supreme Court so
held.
With the exception of these minor points, the usual principles of adverse
possession are equally applicable to riparian ownership. Sherman v. Chicago Mill and
Lumber Company, supra.
D.

Conveyancing Rules
Arkansas adheres to the general rule that conveyances of riparian lands are

presumed to include any accretions thereto, whether accurately described in the deed or
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not. Gill v. Hedgecock. 207 Ark. 1079, 184 S.W.2d 262 (1944). This is not to say that a
conveyance, if sufficiently clear, cannot reserve or except accretions, exclude the bed of
the waterway, or make the bank the boundary. To the contrary, if the intent is clear, it
will be given effect. See, e.g., Kilgo v. Cook. 174 Ark. 432 (1927); Perry v. Sadler. 76
Ark. 43 (1905).
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1 A u g u s t 198 2

STREAMS CONSIDERED NAVIGABLE
IN LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT
("NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE U.S.")

Stream

Tributary of

Head of
navigation

Navigable
length in
LRD miles,
approx.

Total
navigab
length
mil es
approx

Arkansas River

White River

Mouth of Grand (Neosho)
River, Oklahoma
(Head of Nav. not in LRD)

303

391

White River

Mississippi River

441
Goshen, AR (Hwy 45 Bridge)
31-17-28W, Washington Co., AR
(Portion of White Riv. between
McClellan-Kerr Ark Riv Nav
System Lock #1 and mile 10, and
Newport, Ark, at mile 255 are
under jurisdiction of Memphis
District)

686

218

218

(mile 0+010 and 255 to 686)

Black River

White River

Mengo, MO (Mo-Pac R.R. Bridge)
22-25N-6E, Butler Co., MO

Big Maumelle
River

Arkansas River

Lake Maumelle Dam
34-3N-14W, Pulaski Co., AR

6

6

Buffalo River

White River

Mouth of Rush Creek
11-17N-15W, Marion Co., AR

22

22

Cadron Creek

Arkansas River

Pleasant Valley, AR (Mouth
East Fork)
9-6N-14W, Faulkner Co., AR

8

8

Current River

Black River

Van Buren, MO (Hwy 60)
24-27N-1W, Carter Co., MO

90

90

Eleven Point
River

Spring River

Bardley, MO (Hwy 160)
19-23N-2W, Oregon Co., MO

54

54

Fourche Creek

Arkansas River

Little Rock, AR
16-N-12W, Pulaski Co., AR

Fourche LaFave
River

Arkansas River

Perryville, AR (Hwy 9)
15-4N-17W, Perry Co., AR

9.2
26

9.;
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1 A u g u s t 1982

STREAMS CONSIDERED NAVIGABLE
IN LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT
("NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE U.S.")
(continued)

Total :
Navigable
navigable
Stream
Tributary of
length in
length ir
LRD miles,
miles,
________________________________________________________________________ approx.____ approx.
Head of
navigation

Greers Ferry Lake

Little Red River

Dam to Devils Fork mile 11.5
71
(Lat 92⁰02'N)
NE3-11N-10W, Cleburne Co., AR
Middle Fork mile 10.5 (92°15',
35⁰39')
NW NE 27-12N-12W, Van Buren Co., AR
and South Fork mile 21.5 (92°26',
35°3 4 ')
NW NW 25-11N-14W, Van Buren Co., AR

71

Illinois Bayou

Arkansas River

Shiloh, AR (Russellville Water
Supply Dam)
SE SW 17-8N-20W, Pope Co., AR

12

12

Lake Langhofer

Arkansas River

Pine Bluff, AR (Cutoff Dam)
16-5S-9W, Jefferson Co., AR

5

5

Lee Creek

Arkansas River

Van Buren, AR
6
SW SW 4-9N-32W, Crawford Co., AR

Little Maumelle
River

Arkansas River

Pinnacle, AR (Hwy 300 Bridge)
3-2N-14W, Pulaski Co., AR

Little Red River

White River

Bee Rock, AR
SE SW 36-8N-7W, White Co., AR

31

31

Mulberry River

Arkansas River

Mulberry, AR (I-40 Bridge)
24-10N-29W, Franklin-Crawford
Co., AR

6

6

North Fork River
-Norfork Lake

White River

Dawt, MO (Unnamed Road Crossing) 50
3-22N-12W, Ozark Co., MO

50

Petit Jean River

Arkansas River

Rocky Crossing, AR (Hwy 7)
23-5N-21W, Yell Co., AR

.24

.24

Spring River

Black River

Sloan, Arkansas
South Line Sec 25,
North Line Sec 36-18N-2W,
Lawrence-Randolph Co., AR

8

8

2

6
8.6

8.6

1 August 1982
STREAMS CONSIDERED NAVIGABLE
IN LITTLE ROCK DISTRICT
("NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE U.S.")
(continued)

Stream

Little River

Red River

Head of
navigation

Tributary of

Red River

Navigable
length in
LRD miles,
approx.

Millwood Dam

16

Navigable from Fulton, AR
(463.0) to Index, AR (485.3)
in Little Rock District.
Intermittent portions in
other Districts are also
navigable, both upstream
and downstream

22.3

3

Total
navigabl
length i
miles,
approx.
16

State of Arkansas
Commissioner of State Lands
Charlie D aniels
Commissioner

March 29,1999

Mr. Robert M. Honea
HARDIN, JESSON & TERRY
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 10127
Fort Smith, AR 72917-0127
RE:

Cutoff

Dear Mr. Honea:
For your review, I enclose a copy of Attorney General Mark Pryor’s Opinion
issued in response to Commissioner Daniels’ request dated December 21, 1998. As
anticipated, the opinion does not answer the ultimate question of ownership, however, it
does provide an excellent outline of relevant statutory and case law.
H aving thoroughly reviewed the opinion, the Commissioner’s current position is that the
state holds title to the
Cutoff. As the opinion correctly points out, the issue of
title to beds of navigable rivers is fact intensive. Consequently, prior to divesting the state of
ownership, certain facts must be unequivocally established. The situation addressed in your
letter actually creates two separate fact situations in that your description of the property
refers to both dry land and land that is currently under water.
In the latter case, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 22-5-405, the dry land
created from the river bed may be subject to conveyance by the state to the riparian
landowners assuming certain facts are proved. Accordingly, a statutory scheme exists for the
determination of ownership in cases involving dry land in abandoned river channels. On the
other hand, however, there is no clear statutory scheme for determining the navigability of a
waterway which is the issue created by the land that is currently still underwater. Ownership
to this land rests on the issue of navigability. The Commissioner is neither equipped nor
empowered to determine whether waterways are navigable and therefore relies on
determinations made by the U.S. Corps of Engineers. Obviously, there has been a
determination that the Arkansas River is navigable. Consequently, until proven otherwise,
the Commissioner of State Lands can only assume that waterways created by the river are
navigable as well.
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I am hopeful the above adequately sets fort Commissioner Daniels’ position on this matter.
Should you have any questions, or, wish to discuss this subject further, please feel free to call
me.
Yours very truly,

Carol L. Lincoln
Staff Attorney
Commissioner of State Lands
CLL/lp

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS
Mark Pryor

March 5,1999
The Honorable Charlie Daniels
Commissioner o f State Lands
State Capitol
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
Dear Mr. Daniels:
This is in response to your request for an opinion regarding the ownership o f
certain land located in the Arkansas River. Specifically, you have enclosed a copy
o f a letter from a Fort Smith attorney asking whether the State“ claims title to the
former beds o f the Arkansas River which were cut o ff as a result o f the
channelization o f the river by the Corps o f Engineers in the 1960s.” The letter
refers to an area known as the “
Cutoff” which is described in the
letter as “literally a channel created by the Corps o f Engineers into which the body
o f the Arkansas River was diverted. The letter notes that “[t]he former bed o f the
Arkansas River which was cut o ff by this channel was described as the
The letter continues by stating that: “the former bed o f the Arkansas
River commonly described as
was completely cut o ff as a result o f
the channelization, i.e., there is now no access to it from the Arkansas River with
the possible exception o f extreme flooding conditions. Portions o f the former bed
o f the river are now dry land; other portions remain underwater.” The letter poses
the following question to your office, which you have now forwarded for my
opinion:
Given the foregoing facts, does the State o f Arkansas
claim title to the oil, gas, and minerals underlying the
bed o f the Arkansas River as it was formerly located
before it was cut o ff by the channelization o f the
323 Center Street • Suite 200 • Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
(501) 682-2007 • FAX (501) 682-8084
Internet Website • http://www.ag.state-ar.us/
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Arkansas River? In responding to this inquiry, I
specifically refer you to the following cases:
Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas, 252 Ark. 958, 482
S.W.2d 598 (1972); United States o f America v.
Keenan. 753 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1985).
You state that “[i]n reviewing the information provided, as w ell as relevant case
law, it would appear that if the
Cutoff1 is no longer navigable, then
ownership o f the channel would revert to the riparian owners and the state would
no longer claim it.” You state that you are reluctant, however, to issue your
opinion on this matter, particularly as it relates to oil and gas rights, as the
“Natural Resources Commission” has “exclusive authority over the leasing o f oil
and gas rights owned by the state."2 You therefore ask my opinion “in response to
the inquiry [the letter o f the attorney] enclosed.”
I must note in response to your request that the question posed by the Fort Smith
attorney (“[w]hether or not [the state] claims title to the former beds o f the
Arkansas River”), is not a question o f law upon which I can issue a formal legal
opinion.
The underlying question is whether the State o f Arkansas owns title to the bed o f
the
Questions involving the title to beds o f navigable rivers are fact
intensive. See e.g. 65 C.J .S. Navigable Waters, § 3. In the issuance o f official
legal opinions, I am not empowered or equipped to act as a factfinder, and to

1 It appears that It is the land underlying the
at issue.

and not the “

Cutoff,” which is

2 This Committee is created at A.C.A. § 22-5-804, and is composed o f the Director o f DF&A or his
the Director o f the O il and Gas Commission, The State Geologist, the State Forester, the Director
o f the Arkansas Soil and W ater Conservation Commission, the Commissioner o f State Lands, the Director
o f the State Game and Fish Commission, the D irector o f the Department o f Parks and Tourism or his
the Director o f the Arkansas Department o f Pollution Control and Ecology, and the Director o f
the N atural Heritage Commission. The only statutory powers granted the Committee appear to be the
establishm ent o f a schedule o f minimum fees and royalties, as well as the terms and conditions for various
types o f permits and leases, and the changing o f such schedule and term s. See A .C A . § 22-5-804 ( c) and
(d). It appears that you, as Commissioner o f State Lands, have the authority to actually grant leases and
permits for the taking o f oil and gas from the beds o f navigable waters and other state lands. See A. C .A . §
22-5-801.
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definitively determine an issue based upon a statement o f the facts given by one
party to the dispute (such as posed in the letter enclosed with your request).
In an effort to be helpful, however, I can set out the relevant law on the topic,
which may then be applied to the facts as you find them.
The State o f Arkansas, o f course, owns title to the beds o f all navigable waterways
within the state. See Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 496 S.W.2d 372 (1973); Clarke
v. Montgomery County, 268 Ark. 942, 597 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. App. 1980);
McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 179 S.W.2d 661 (1944); Barboro v. Boyle,
119 Ark. 377, 178 S.W. 378 (1915); Stale v. Southern Sand & Material Co., 113
Ark. 149, 167 S.W. 854 (1914). It has been stated that:
When the Original Colonies ratified the Constitution,
they succeeded to the Crown’s title and interest in the
beds o f navigable waters within their respective
borders. See Utah Division o f State Lands v. United
States, 482 U .S. 193, 195-96, 107 S.C t. 2318,2320-21,
96 L. Ed .2d 162 (1987); Bonelli Cattle Co., v. Arizona,
414 U.S. 313, 317-318, 94 S.C t. 517, 521-522, 38
L.Ed.2d 526 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
Oregon ex rel. State Land. Board v. Corvallis Sand &
G ravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 97 S.C t. 582, 50 L.Ed. 2d
550 (1977). Under the equal footing doctrine, new
states were admitted with ‘the same rights, sovereignty
and jurisdiction . . . as the original States possess
within their respective borders.’ Bonelli, 414 U.S. at
318, 94 S.C t. at 522. Accordingly, title to lands
beneath navigable waters passed from the federal
government to the states upon their admission to the
Union.
101 Ranch v. U.S., 905 F.2d 180, 182 (8th Cir. 1990).
This is true assuming there had been no valid federal grant o f particular land to an
individual prior to the state’s admission to the Union. Utah Division o f State
Lands v. United States, su pra
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While the application o f the “equal footing doctrine” to the states at the time o f
their admission to the Union requires reference to and construction o f federal law,
thereafter the role o f the equal-footing doctrine is ended, and the land is subject to
the laws o f the State. California ex re l. State Lands Commission v. United States,
457 U.S. 273 (1982) and Corvallis, supra. State law w ill therefore control the
question o f whether the State o f Arkansas has been divested o f title to the property
in question. Id.
Arkansas law on the subject is derived from both statutes and the common law.
The most relevant Arkansas statute is A .C A . § 22-5-404 (Repl. 1996), which is
the codification o f two Acts o f Arkansas, Acts 1945, No. 203 and Acts 1953, No.
126. The statute currently provides as follows:
(a) The title to all lands which have formed or may
form in the beds o f nonnavigable lakes, or in
abandoned river channels or beds, whether or not still
navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above
the ordinary high-water mark, shall vest in the riparian
owners to the lands and shall be assessed and taxed as
other lands.
(b) The lands referred to in subsection (a) o f this
section shall include those lands which have emerged
or which may emerge by accretion, reliction,
evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds o f
lakes or from former navigable streams, whether by
natural or artificial causes, or whether or not the lakes
were originally formed from the channel or course o f
navigable or nonnavigable streams.
The original Act 203 o f 1945 applied only to lands emerging from nonnavigable
lakes. The 1953 act expanded the section to include the language about
abandoned river channels. In fa c t, the preamble to Act 126 o f 1953 recites the
following:
WHEREAS many cut-offs have been made in the
M ississippi river, and other rivers in the State o f
Arkansas, both naturally and artificially for the
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purpose o f controlling the current o f the river and the
bank stabilization, and many old former river beds
have remained as the result o f such cut-offs and have
gradually built up and reached the high-water mark as
defined by the Supreme Court o f Arkansas in the case
o f S t Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v.
Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931, and permanent
timber vegetation has grown on all or part o f said old
abandoned river beds, and
WHEREAS it is intended hereby to clarify the intent
o f Act 203 o f the General Assembly approved March
8, 1945, and to eliminate any question as to the intent
thereof;
THEREFORE, Sections 1 and 2 o f Act 203 o f the
1945 General Assembly are hereby respectively
amended to read as follows . . . .
It has been stated that Act 126 o f 1953 “was designed to furnish a means whereby
the State could acknowledge that a river bed has been abandoned.” G ill v. Porter,
248 Ark. 140,450 S.W.2d 306 (1970).
The 1953 act left unamended sections 3 and 4 o f the original 1945 act, which
authorize the State Land Commissioner to execute deeds to the lands described in
the statute to adjacent riparian landowners assuming certain listed conditions are
m et See current A.C.A . § 22-5-4Q5 (Repl. 1996). A survey o f the lands in
question is required. A.C.A . § 22-5-405(a) and (b). The land at issue must have
emerged to the “mean high-water mark o f any such stream or lake ” A.C.A . § 225-405 (a). Affidavits must be filed to this effect and must state that the lands are
“capable o f cultivation.” See A.C.A. § 22-5-405(d).
Although there is no case precisely on point, it appears that the statute applies
notwithstanding the fact that the land emerged from an artificial cause, or from
what might be termed in the common law an “avulsive,” rather than an “accretive”
event. The statute, at least as regards the state's title, appears to change what is
the generally accepted common-law rule that land exposed by an avulsion will not
operate to change ownership or the boundary o f a given tract, while land formed
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by an accretion w ill. See e.g. 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters, § § 8 2 and 86 (b). See
also, Horne v. Howe Lumber C o .209 Ark. 2 0 2 , 190 S.W.2d 7 (1945), and Garrett
v. Sta t e, 118 N J . Super. 594, 289 A.2d 542 (1972). The statute includes lands
which have emerged from natural or artificial causes, by “accretion, reliction,
evaporation, drainage, or otherwise. . .
A.C.A . § 22-5-405 (b) (emphasis
added). The statute, as it relates to the rights o f private riparian owners as against
each other, appears to have been applied in conjunction with the common law
doctrines o f accretion and avulsion to determine the appropriate boundary.3 See
e.g., Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas Co., 252 Ark. 958, 482 S.W.2d 598 (1972)
and G ill v. Porter, 248 Ark. 140, 450 S.W 2 d 306 (1970). See also, United States
V.
Keenan,753 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1985).
Clearly, this statute was intended to allow the state to divest itself o f title to lands
emerged from a river bed after the construction o f a “cut-off” The statute only
applies, however, to “lands” which have emerged to the high water mark. It does
not appear to apply to lands still under water. The letter enclosed with your
request indicates that “[p] ortions o f the former bed o f the river are now dry land;
other portions remain underwater .”
As regards lands still underwater, or below the ordinary high water mark, common
law principles must be applied. It is held in Arkansas, in contrast to the majority
o f states, that because the state’s tid e to the land under water rests on navigability,
when the navigation ceases the tide terminates, and riparian rights attach. See
Parker, Commissioner o f Revenue v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W.2d 891
(1953), relying on Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906). See also United
Stales v. Keenan, supra; Gill v. Porter, supra; Porter v. Arkansas Western Gas
Co., sup ra, and Five Lakes Outing Club v. Horseshoe Lake. Protective Association,
226 Ark. 136, 288 S.W.2d 942 (1956). Compare 65 C.J .S. Navigable Waters, §
97. A determination, therefore, o f the tide to the lands still under water will
require a finding as to the water’s navigability. This is an inherently factual
question. If no longer “navigable,” Arkansas common law provides that riparian

3 It appears, additionally, that the doctrines o f accretion and avulsion are still relevant for determining any
county boundary issues arising from the subject property. See eg. Adkisson v. Starr, 222 Ark. 331, 260
S.W.2 d 956 (1953); Deloney v. State, 88 A rk .311,115 S.W. 138 (1908); and Matthews v. McGee, 358 F.2d
516 (8th Cir. 1966). The correspondence enclosed with your request indicates that foe subject property is
located in “Crawford and Sebastian Counties." The Arkansas River is foe boundary between those
counties. See Fulton Ferry & Bridge Co. v. Blackwood, 173 Ark. 645,293 S.W . 2 (1927).
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ownership attaches at the time the waters became nonnavigable. See Keenan,
supra, and Gill v. Porter, supra.
While I cannot provide a definitive resolution o f the question posed, I hope the
foregoing recitation o f the law is helpful in your approach to this issue.
Senior Assistant Attorney General Elana C. Wills prepared the foregoing opinion,
which I hereby approve.
Sincerely,

M ARK PRYOR
Attorney General
MP:ECW/cyh
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22-5-403

22-5-403. Title to lands formed in navigable waters.

(a) All land which has formed or may form in the navigable waters of
this state, and within the original boundaries of a former owner of land
upon such waters, shall belong to and the title thereto shall vest in the
former owner, his heirs or assigns, or in whoever may have lawfully
succeeded to the right of the former owner therein.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the rights or
interests of third parties in any such land acquired before the passage
of this section.
22-5-404. Title to lands formed in nonnavigable lakes or abandoned river channels.

(a) The title to all lands which have formed or may form in the beds
of nonnavigable lakes, or in abandoned river channels or beds, whether
or not still navigable, which reformed lands or alluvia are above the
ordinary high-water mark, shall vest in the riparian owners to the
lands and shall be assessed and taxed as other lands.
(b) The lands referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include
those lands which have emerged or which may emerge by accretion,
reliction, evaporation, drainage, or otherwise from the beds of lakes or
from former navigable streams, whether by natural or artificial causes,
or whether or not the lakes were originally formed from the channel or
course of navigable or nonnavigable streams.

22-5-405. Deeds to lands in lakes or rivers.

(a) The Commissioner of State Lands is empowered and authorized
to execute deeds to lands described in § 22-5-404 to riparian owners
upon application and the filing of proof of record ownership of adjacent
lands and proof of proper survey of the lands, conveying all the right,
title, and interest of the State of Arkansas to lands as have emerged or
may emerge to the mean high-water mark of any such stream or lake.
(b) All applicants for deeds under this section shall, upon filing an
application therefor, deposit with the Commissioner of State Lands the
estimated cost of survey of the lands to be fixed by the Commissioner of
State Lands. He shall thereupon direct the county surveyor of the
county in which the lands are located, or some other competent
surveyor to be selected by the Commissioner of State Lands, to
accurately survey the lands and compile the field notes and plat the
lands in reference to the survey of adjacent lands, by the extension of
township, range, and section lines, and to file the field notes and plats
in the office of the Commissioner of State Lands.
(c) Upon the filing of the field notes and plats, the Commissioner of
State Lands shall pay for the cost of the survey of lands applied for out
of the money deposited as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) The applicant shall, after the filing of the field notes and survey,
file affidavits of at least three (3) competent persons having full
personal knowledge of the facts, stating that the lands applied for have
actually emerged to high-water m ark and are capable of cultivation,
whereupon the Commissioner of State Lands may issue the deed upon
the payment of a deed fee of five dollars ($5.00).

22-5-406. L im ited q u itclaim of stre am b ed of M ulberry River.
(a) The State of Arkansas quitclaims, to the owners of adjacent
lands, title to the streambed of the Mulberry River, excluding oil, gas,
and other mineral rights underlying the stream, to the center of the
stream. However, the state retains an easement to run with the land for
free passage by the public over the land by canoe, boat, other watercraft, swimming, wading, or walking, and for fishing, recreation, travel,
commerce, and other purposes.
(b) (1) The State of Arkansas relinquishes and quitclaims to the
owners of oil, gas, and other minerals underlying adjacent lands, and to
their lessees, all right, title, and interest in and to the oil, gas, and other
minerals underlying the bed of the Mulberry River.
(2) No affirmative action shall be required by the mineral owner or
lessee, of the State of Arkansas to enable the mineral owner or lessee to
retain ownership of or leasehold interest in the minerals under the bed
of the Mulberry River.
(3) (A) If the mineral owner or lessee desires record proof of his
continued ownership of the oil, gas, and other minerals, he may file
an application with the Commissioner of State Lands for a quitclaim
deed covering the oil, gas, and other minerals under the bed of the
river.
(B) If the lands have been surveyed and platted, the mineral owner
may furnish the Commissioner of State Lands a copy of the survey
and plat.
(C) If the survey and plat sufficiently identify the land, no further
survey shall be required.
(4) (A) In the alternative, the mineral owner may file with his
application a deposit of the estimated cost of a survey, and the
Commissioner shall direct the county surveyor of the county in which
the lands are located, or some other competent surveyor, to make an
accurate survey of the lands and to plat them in reference to the
survey of adjacent lands and file the survey and plat in the Office of
the Commissioner of State Lands.
(B) Upon the filing of the survey and plat, the Commissioner shall
pay for the cost of the survey out of the money deposited as provided
in subdivision (d)(1) of this section.
(C) If the deposit is insufficient for that purpose, the Commissioner
may require an additional deposit.
(D) If any deposited funds remain after payment, they shall be
refunded to the depositor.
(5) After the survey and plat are filed, the applicant shall file
affidavits of at least two (2) competent persons having full personal
knowledge of the facts, establishing that the applicant is the present
owner or lessee of the minerals in and under the streambed.
(6) Upon receipt of the survey and affidavits, the Commissioner of
State Lands may issue a quitclaim deed to the applicant upon the
payment of a deed fee of one dollar ($1.00). The quitclaim deed
establishes that the state makes no claim to the oil, gas, and other
minerals under the bed of the stream.

22-5-815. Mineral rights in lands covered by artificially created
navigable waters.

(a) The State of Arkansas shall not acquire title to the oil, gas, and
other minerals in and under lands covered by navigable waters artificially created by agencies of the United States or the State of Arkansas
in any instance where the underlying minerals are not purchased or
condemned and compensation paid therefor.
(b) The private ownership of the oil, gas, and other minerals in and
under lands covered by artificially created navigable waters as established by this section shall be subservient to, and the exercise of rights
of extraction and removal thereof shall not be permitted to interfere
with or impair, the rights of public navigation, transportation, fishing,
and recreation in and upon such navigable waters.
(c) No affirmative action shall be required by the mineral owner or
the State of Arkansas to enable the mineral owner to retain ownership
of the minerals in and under the artificially inundated lands.
(d) (1) If the mineral owner desires record proof of his continued
ownership of the minerals, he may file an application with the Commissioner of State Lands for a quitclaim deed covering the minerals in
and under the inundated lands.
(2) If the inundated lands have been surveyed and platted by an
agency of the United States or the State of Arkansas, the mineral owner
may furnish a copy of the survey and plat to the Commissioner of State
Lands.
(3) If the survey and plat sufficiently identify the land, no further
survey shall be required.
(e)
(1) In the alternative, the mineral owner may file a deposit of the
estimated cost of a survey with his application, and the Commissioner
shall direct the county surveyor of the county in which the lands are
located, or some other competent surveyor, to make an accurate survey
of the lands and to plat them in reference to the survey of adjacent
lands and file the survey and plat in the office of the Commissioner of
State Lands.
(2) Upon the filing of the survey and plat, the Commissioner of State
Lands shall pay for the cost of the survey out of the money deposited as
provided in subdivision (e)(1) of this section.
(3) If the deposit is insufficient for that purpose, the Commissioner of
State Lands may require an additional deposit.
(4) If any deposited funds remain after payment, they shall be
refunded to the depositor.
(f) After the survey and plat of the agency of the United States or the
State of Arkansas or the survey and plat of the surveyor selected by the
Commissioner of State Lands are filed, the applicant shall file affidavits
of at least two (2) competent persons having fu ll personal knowledge of
the facts, establishing that the applicant is the present owner of the
minerals in and under the lands shown in the survey and that the lands
have been inundated without payment of compensation for the minerals by an agency of the United States or the State of Arkansas.
(g) Upon receipt of the survey and affidavits, the Commissioner of
State Lands may issue a quitclaim deed to the applicant upon the
payment of a deed fee of one dollar ($1.00). The quitclaim deed shall
establish that the state has no claim in and makes no claim to the oil,
gas, and other minerals in and under the lands described in the survey.
(h) The State of Arkansas quitclaims and relinquishes to the previous mineral owner and his successors and assigns all of the state’s
right, title, and interest to the oil, gas, and other minerals in and under
lands covered prior to February 23, 1965, by artificially created navigable waters caused by an agency of the United States or the State of
Arkansas and for which compensation has not been paid.
(i) If the previous mineral owner desires record proof of his continued
ownership of the minerals, he may follow the procedure outlined in this
section and obtain a quitclaim deed from the Commissioner of State
Lands.

22-6-202. P r o p e r ty o f sta te.

(a) All islands formed or which may form in the navigable waters of
this state are declared to be the property of the state, except as provided
in § 22-6-204, and subject to sale and disposition in the manner and
form provided in this subchapter.
(b) The Commissioner of State Lands shall have full power and
authority to lease or grant submerged lands and the Commissioner of
State Lands shall promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively carry out the provisions of this section, and, upon
adoption, such rules and regulations shall have the full force and effect
of law.

